The following article is adapted and reprinted from the M&A Tax Report, Vol. 11, No. 10, May 2003, Panel Publishers, New York, NY.
BOOT OR BOOTY?
By Robert W. Wood Okay, so this is a silly
title, but that should be nothing new to M&A Tax Report readers. Notwithstanding
the staid world of the Internal Revenue Service (and the M&A field,
too), a mirthful title in this publication should hardly be a surprise.
In a decision smacking more of the independent contractor area than the
tax-free reorganization provisions, the Tax Court has held in Jerry S.
Payne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-90, Tax Analysts Doc. No. 20037952,
2003 TNT 60-8, that a transfer of a topless dance club from one corporation
to another qualified as a D reorganization, and that there was no distribution
of boot taxable to the owner. Just the Facts, Ma'am
The facts of the ruling
are at least amusing, though if one can get beyond the titillating fact
pattern, there is actually a lesson to be learned in this tiny transaction
about boot and its tax treatment. Jerry Payne was a lawyer with a bit of
an unusual practice. In exchange for legal services rendered, he wound
up with control of a topless dance club. Fraught with the kind of problems
that such businesses often have, the club was eventually ruled by the Service
to have understated income and overstated deductions. Payne lost in the
Tax Court, but more enlightened minds prevailed in the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals.
The Fifth Circuit reversed
the case, mostly on penalty issues, concluding that the Tax Court had erred
in ruling that the IRS had proven fraud. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the Tax Court had erroneously relied on a statutory fraud exception
rather than the statute of limitations argument that Mr. Payne made to
attempt to prevent a fraud penalty.
Payne's ownership of the
club went back to 1988, when he received personal property interests in
the club in satisfaction of legal fees. Payne leased his personal property
back to the corporation, paying $10 and a promissory note for the remaining
stock of the corporation. A new company (Newco) was incorporated in 1990,
with Payne as the sole shareholder. Operation of the club was then transferred
from Payne individually to Newco, which became the sublessee of both the
premises and the personal property. A year later, in 1991, Newco sold all
of the club assets for $1.1 million. Expenses and More?
The years under audit
revealed that Payne took various expenses, primarily for parking and interest.
The IRS determined that the various payments received by Payne amounted
to constructive dividends. The Tax Court generally found that the expenses
were promotional in nature, and therefore were deductible by the company.
The interesting issue, though, was the reorganization. The Tax Court found
that the transfer of the club to the new company in 1990 was a tax-free
reorganization under Section 368(a)(1)(D).
Moreover, the court found
that there was no distribution of taxable boot to Mr. Payne. Why? The club
was owned and operated by what was then Payne's wholly-owned corporation
(2618, Inc.), not by Payne individually. The court specifically rejected
the IRS' suggestion that Newco's sale of the assets less than three months
after it acquired them indicated that they were sold as part of an overall
plan to transfer the assets from 2618, Inc. to Newco. The court determined
that Payne's efforts on behalf of the club were motivated by his desire
to receive the legal fees. Step Transactions?
Lately, we've talked
a lot about step transaction doctrine so it may strike some readers as
odd that the IRS didn't have more success here, seeking to integrate the
transfer of assets from 2618, Inc. and the sale shortly thereafter by Newco. Shake Your Booty?
I can't resist leaving
this topic without pointing out that boot in reorganizations is always
an interesting topic, and one that prompts at least some degree of taxpayer
fear. Still, the whole enchilada (so to speak) is reorganization treatment,
since most types of reorganizations do permit boot. I found it interesting,
therefore, that this case also invoked the continuity of business enterprise
doctrine.
The government argued
that Newco's sale of its assets less than three months after it acquired
them, indicating that those assets were sold as part of an overall plan
to transfer assets from 2618 to Newco. The Tax Court noted (seemingly with
some sympathy), that the taxpayer here was motivated all along by his desire
to receive in cash his overdue legal fees. Indeed, the Tax Court said that
his ongoing efforts to secure the permits for the club were doubtless motivated
by a desire to make the club saleable.
However, the Tax Court
said that the Service acknowledged that there was no direct evidence that
the Newco sale of assets was part of an overall plan existing at the time
of the transfer of the club's operation from 2618 to Newco. Significantly,
the Tax Court said that it would not infer the existence of such a plan
by reason of the proximity in time of the two transactions (whew!).
Plus, the Tax Court went
on to say that the mere fact that the taxpayer may have contemplated selling
the club at the time of the transfer from one company to the other does
not require a finding that the transfer lacked continuity of business enterprise.
The Tax Court cites Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949).
In Lewis, a corporation sold two of its three lines of business and, because
it was temporarily unable to sell the third, placed the assets of the remaining
business in a new corporation pending a sale (which occurred less than
three years later), and then liquidated.
Because the transferee
corporation continued to conduct the old business, the Tax Court and First
Circuit sustained the finding that the transaction had a valid business
purpose and that it qualified as a nondivisive D reorganization. That case
was not one in which the intent was for the transferee corporation to immediately
make a liquidating distribution of the assets received from the transferor
corporation. All's Well That Ends
Well
Mr. Payne got paid his
legal fees, his reorg treatment was upheld, and he even got to be a club
owner for a little while and make a profit! Boot or Booty?,
Vol. 11, No. 10, The M&A Tax Report (May 2003), p. 7.