The following article is adapted and reprinted from the M&A Tax Report, Vol. 9, No. 11, June 2001, Panel Publishers, New York, NY.
CORRECTION AND CLARIFICATION REGARDING NONQUALIFIED OPTIONS
By Robert W. Wood
The May issue of The M&A Tax Report (Volume 9, Number 10), contained
an error. The article entitled "Tax and Accounting Primer for Nonqualified
Stock Options" suggests that it is possible to make a Section 83(b) election
for nonqualified stock options (NSOs) which do not have a readily ascertainable
fair market value. That is not so. Several M&A Tax Report readers were
kind enough to point out the error.
NSOs which do not have a readily ascertainable fair market value
are simply not considered property for purposes of Section 83. Hence, a
Section 83(b) election would not be available. The term "readily ascertainable
fair market value" is defined in Reg. §1.83-7. It is pretty clear
that the 83(b) election simply doesn't work here.
One M&A Tax Report reader (Kenneth Kail of Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius in New York) was kind enough to send along a case, Richard A. and
Alice D. Cramer, et al. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 225 (1993). The Cramer
case squarely considers this issue — which I suppose means that at least
someone thought the issue was worth arguing about and trying in Tax Court
— and flatly refuses to give the taxpayer a break. It is an interesting
case, and there were several quite prominent counsel at the taxpayer's
counsel table. Both Brookes Billman (of the New York University School
of Law) and Michael Saltzman (of White & Case in New York) were involved
as counsel for the taxpayers. Needless to say, neither one of these lawyers
is a slouch.
They argued, I thought quite persuasively, that the options in Cramer
did have a fair market value and that the Section 83(b) election was available
and worked. It is hard to disagree with the statute though. Section 83(e)(3)
flatly states that Section 83 "shall not apply to...the transfer of an
option without a readily ascertainable fair market value." Although the
legislative history does not say much, if anything, about this, Judge Cohen
considered this provision as well as the regulations and case law in concluding
that there was no value here and that the Section 83(b) election didn't
work. Interestingly, the Tax Court's opinion in Cramer cites Brookes Billman,
who wrote Nonstatutory Stock Options, 383 Tax Management A-8 (1984). Billman
and others are cited for the proposition that commentators believe the
1976 Act's legislative history indicates Congress' disapproval with the
regulations that specify when the value of an option is "readily ascertainable."
Judge Cohen evidently doesn't put much stock in these commentators.
Indeed, Judge Cohen also flatly rejects the taxpayer's arguments
in Cramer that the fact that a Section 83(b) election was made bootstraps
the option into definitely having a readily ascertainable fair market value.
The taxpayers cited Walt Disney Productions v. U.S., 480 F.2d 66 (9th Cir.
1973), for the proposition that the 1976 Conference Report (legislative
history subsequent to the Section 83 regulations) should be given considerable
weight. According to Judge Cohen, no matter how much weight is given to
all of this, the argument just doesn't fly.
I thought it quite interesting that the taxpayers in Cramer also
argued that their advisors (blame it on the advisors!) relied on Alves
v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 864 (1982), aff'd, 734 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1984),
in determining the tax treatment of the options. The taxpayers in Cramer
cited the dissent in Alves for the proposition that the court agreed that
zero income could be reported at the time of the grant of an option, and
that capital gains could then be reported on its sale.
Alves, clearly an important (and even bellwether) case, involved
the question whether Section 83 applied where the taxpayer had paid fair
market value for the stock when he received it, and therefore received
no income when the stock was transferred to him. Judge Cohen in Cramer
flatly says that the Alves holding bears no relationship to the Cramer
facts, where the taxpayers attempted to report a fair market value of zero
on receipt of their options, not stock. The issue, Judge Cohen states,
is simply whether the options had a readily ascertainable fair market value
when they were transferred.
The Cramer opinion is quite long and quite detailed, and is worth
a read. Thanks again to M&A Tax Report subscriber, Ken Kail, for pointing
it out.
One More Thing...
The May 2001 issue included one more point (this one on accounting
treatment), that certainly needs clarification. Our gratitude to subscriber,
John Ireland, Tax Director of DynCorp, for pointing out these issues.
If a company follows APB 25 (and has not adopted FAS 123), when a
nonqualified option is exercised, there is no charge to earnings, as long
as the NSO was a "market value" option at the date of grant. Thus, if the
grant price equaled the fair market value at the date of grant, there is
no charge to earnings. The only book entry made is that paid in capital
is credited, and federal income tax receivable is debited to reflect the
permanent tax benefit to the company (which does not affect earnings). John Ireland was kind enough to also suggest that in the "accounting
treatment change" note on page 7 of the May issue (part of the article
entitled "Treatment of Options in M&A Deals," which commences on page
5), we could have pointed out that if there is an "Interpretation 44" event
causing the books to recognize compensation expense, there is no corresponding
tax deduction (or W-2 income). However, the tax effect is debited to paid-in
capital and credited to federal income tax payable for the permanently
lost tax deduction.
Correction and Clarification, Vol. 9, No. 11, M&A Tax
Report (June 2001), p. 8.