The following article is adapted and reprinted from the M&A Tax Report, Vol. 9, No. 4, November 2000, Panel Publishers, New York, NY.
ADDITIONAL SPINS By Robert W. Wood In our regular review of spinoffs, several recent announcements are
worthy of note. Sara Lee, the Chicago-based food giant, has announced a
plan to spinoff its Coach Leather Handbags business, which it acquired
in 1985. Although Sara Lee had expanded the Coach brand enormously, its
plan is now to focus on certain core businesses — which do not include
the leathermaker. See Bowe, "Sara Lee Streamlining Means Spin-off for Classy
Coach," Financial Times Weekend (London), Sept. 16-17, 2000, p. 10. Elsewhere, AT&T has proposed a spinoff that would be yet another
significant step in breaking up this giant telecommunications company.
The idea is to spinoff the consumer long-distance business owned by AT&T,
something that has been struggling financially for quite some time. Although
AT&T has been courting buyers for its consumer long-distance business
for months, apparently it has not obtained the price it wanted. As a result,
a spinoff as an alternative emerged. As we have noted in The M&A Tax Report many times before, post-spinoff
contractual relationships must be monitored. This is something that the
Service looks at closely. One issue AT&T continues to discuss is how
to structure agreements with the spun-off entity that would allow AT&T
to continue to offer bundled services to its customers. Those services
include cable, high-speed internet access and wireless. See Solomon and
Deogun, "AT&T Proposes Long-Distance Spinoff," Wall Street Journal,
Oct. 4, 2000, p. A3. If the AT&T spinoff happens, it will sit in the ranks of the
most enormous restructurings, along with the original 1984 break-up of
AT&T, which spun-off the regional Bell Companies. History buffs will
recall that also in the ranks of huge spin transactions were the 1996 spinoffs
of Lucent Technologies, Inc. and NCR Corp. Interestingly, AT&T has considered spinning off its long-distance
business with Liberty Media Group, a content and programming concern that
trades as a tracking stock of AT&T. Apparently those plans are on hold,
though, and some have noted that Liberty Media may separately be the subject
of a spinoff. As The Wall Street Journal noted "there could be tax implications
for such a spinoff, however." Id. That's the trouble with so many of these grand ideas, someone then
needs to consider whether a ruling under Section 355 will be available.
At the same time, many of these transactions are inherently far simpler
than a third party sale. As for the AT&T consumer long-distance business,
spinning it off would be easier to do now since it, by definition, would
not require negotiations with other parties, and apparently has the support
of management and at least some of the board. Buybacks and Post-Spin Share Retentions Finally, Equifax, a company which collects the credit histories of
consumers, may be considering an attempt to boost its share price. Equifax
has another (albeit lesser known) unit, one which processes checks and
credit cards and is increasing revenue at a far greater rate than the traditional
Equifax credit history unit. Recently, various commentators and investors
have decided that maybe it was time for Equifax to spinoff this unit. See
Mollenkamp, "Some Investors Give Equifax Its Own Report: Spin Off Payment
Business to Boost the Stock," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 29, 2000, p. C2. On the other side of the spinoff corridor, Alza Corp. has announced
that it will acquire all of the Class A Common Shares outstanding in its
spinoff, Crescendo Pharmaceuticals Corp., for $100 million. Crescendo was
spun-off from Alza in 1997. See "Deal to Repurchase Spinoff is Set to $100
Million," Wall Street Journal, Oct. 3, 2000, p. A10. This Alza/Crescendo
deal should focus attention on share retentions and share buy-backs after
spinoffs. For a spinoff to qualify, the distributing corporation must distribute
all of the stock or securities it owns in the controlled corporation, or
at least an amount sufficient to represent control. If it does the latter,
the company must establish that the retention of the controlled corporation
stock and/or securities is not part of a plan that has tax avoidance as
one of its principal purposes. It is typically difficult to justify a stock
retention, although perhaps the regulations go overboard in saying that
ordinarily the business purpose for the distribution will mandate that
all stock and securities be distributed. See Reg. §1.355-2(e)(2). The classic ruling on stock retentions in the wake of a spinoff is
Revenue Ruling 75-321, where the IRS permitted a retention of 5% of the
stock in a controlled corporation in a case where eleven of the shareholders
of the distributing corporation each owned between 1-5% of its stock. The
reason the IRS gives for approving this stock retention was that the retention
had an independent business purpose — to provide collateral for short-term
financing for the distributing corporation's other businesses. The idea
is that a business purpose for the retention (which should be different
from the business purpose for the spin!) must be shown. In Revenue Ruling 75-321, the IRS was also able to say that the stock
retention by the distributing corporation was not sufficiently large to
enable the distributing corporation to maintain "practical control" of
the controlled corporation. Admittedly, this is a somewhat amorphous test.
Nevertheless, some thought should be given to whether even a small percentage
of stock, relatively speaking, might be considered to imply practical control. More recently, the IRS has blessed certain retentions by more widely-held
entities. The Service has suggested that rulings on Section 355 transactions
may be appropriate where:
there is business purpose for the retention; the retained stock or securities will be disposed of as soon as possible
(as soon as the business purpose for the retention is accomplished), but
in any event no later than five years after the spinoff; none of the parent's directors or officers will also serve in a similar
capacity with the subsidiary; and the retained stock is voted in the same proportions as the "public vote." The volume of letter rulings on this topic is not exactly staggering,
but there have been a few that are certainly worthy of note. One was Letter
Ruling 9909027, where a spinoff and IPO were to occur. In the ruling, both
the parent and its subsidiary needed equity capital. They devised a spinoff
followed by an IPO of stock of the controlled corporation. The parent distributed
80% of the subsidiary's stock to its shareholders, retaining the remaining
20%. Investment bankers advised that retaining this 20% would lower the
cost of raising capital. After the spinoff, the subsidiary undertook the IPO. The ruling
contemplates that the parent would make a sale of the remaining stock (either
in the public offering or shortly thereafter), but in any event no later
than five years following the distribution. Noting the valid business purpose
for the retention, the ruling was favorable. Last Word Finally, U.S. Industries has announced a plan to spinoff several
divisions to shareholders by the end of this year. U.S. Industries, a maker
of building products, announced a plan to spinoff its lighting and industrial
tools businesses as a special dividend. Although no names are set yet,
the two businesses to be distributed consist of the Lighting Corp. of America
unit, European lighting fixture maker SiTeco, and Spear & Jackson,
an international maker of industrial handtools. See "U.S. Industries Plans
Spinoff of Divisions as Special Dividend," Wall Street Journal, Sept. 15,
2000, p. A8.
Additional Spins, Vol. 9, No. 4, The M&A Tax Report (November
2000), p. 6.